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W
hile “warfare remains a violent clash of 
interests between organized groups char-
acterized by the use of force,” the media 
war was, and still is, a critical component for both Rus-
sian and Chechen strategies in the fight for Chechnya.1 
The wars in Chechnya were won and lost, in large 
part, by the attention or lack thereof on the part of both 
sides to information operations, specifically media 
operations. The Chechen and Russian approaches to 
media operations were significantly different during 
the first war (1994-1996); there was also a discern-
able shift in the nature of media operations conducted 
by both sides during the second war (1999-present).
Media during the First War:
The Chechen Perspective and Approach
During the first Chechen war (1994-1996) the Chechen 
resistance used TV and print media, both domestic and 
international, to get their message out, creating world-
wide sympathy for their cause. Relatively free access best 
describes the Chechen resistance's relationship with the 
media personnel flowing into Grozny during the initial 
battle for the capital. Whether by design or not, the Chech-
ens made considerable efforts to educate and inform the 
world about who they were and why they were fighting.
Mark Bauman of NBC's Moscow Bureau covered the 
war from both the Russian and Chechen side, and while 
in Grozny meeting with Chechen commander Shamil 
Basaev, he was given Basaev's ring for safe passage 
within the besieged capital. The ring, akin to a key to 
the city, enabled the NBC crew to travel block to block, 
between insurgent groups with relative ease, gathering 
material for numerous broadcasts.2 Other journalists 
found Chechen hospitality and access to be equally as 
good. Whether the fair treatment was part of a specific, 
premeditated media campaign is debatable. Some jour-
nalists felt that the openness with which they were greeted 
by Basaev and other serious fighters was more a condi-
tion of traditional Islamic hospitality, while others credit 
Chechen culture more than Islamic tradition specifically.
It is impossible to overestimate the favorable condi-
tions in which the Chechens found themselves at the end 
of 1994. The Russian Army was in dire straights; cor-
ruption was rampant, and the global audiences more than 
curious regarding the mysterious Chechens. The Chech-
ens were also perceived to be the underdog, taking on 
the remnants of the mighty Soviet military machine. For 
many journalists and commentators it was impossible to 
ignore the David and Goliath metaphor and they wanted 
to give the Chechens the attention they were seeking.
Even fashion magazines covered the war in vivid 
pictorials of photogenic Chechen fighters dressed in 
insurgent chic, cradling the instruments of their power, 
the AK-47 and RPG, while international news maga-
zines portrayed the war's brutality through images 
of Russian and Chechen civilians suffering in the car-
nage taking place in Grozny as the Russian advance 
into the city center systematically destroyed the capital.
The international media attention given the war 
provided multiple benefits to the Chechens, includ-
ing recruiting. Although numbers were not large, there 
was a significant contribution of non-Chechen fight-
ers lured to Chechnya via the media. Al Khattab, the 
Arab leader of the foreign mujahadeen battalion oper-
ating in Chechnya, claims to have had no idea that 
the Chechens were a Muslim people. It wasn't until 
watching Western news that he learned this and con-
sequently made his way to Chechnya to become a 
major military force during the first and second wars.3
The result of a media-friendly Chechen leadership 
and the worldwide fascination with the tiny republic's 
effort to break free of Moscow's grip led to substantial 
coverage from within Grozny, from the Chechen 
perspective, during the initial seizure of the capital, 
December 1994 to March 1995.
The Chechen side also made extensive use of new 
media, for example, the Internet, to get its message 
out to like-minded individuals and anyone else fol-
lowing the war worldwide. Kavkazcenter.com and a 
handful of other pro-Chechen sites were up and run-
ning very early on in the war, providing information 
from the Chechen side daily, Movladi Udugov receiv-
1. FM3-24, U.S. Army Counteinsurgency Field Manual, 1.1, p. 13.
2. Discussions with Mark Bauman, Washington, D.C., November 10,
2006 and December 19, 2007.
3. Interview with al Khattab by Alpha Diallo Bubakar in Vedeno, 
Chechnya, December 21, 1997 and subsequent discussions during 
spring 1998.
Mark Bauman and his Moscow-based NBC crew outside Grozny run from Russian Spetsnaz (Special Forces); Russian
soldiers have thrown stun grenades and shot at them with rubber bullets, and ordered them out of the area. Image taken from 
CBS video (January 1995).
ing much of the credit. The Chechens also were keen 
to photograph and tape many of their operations; as a 
result, when the Russian military leadership would deny 
operations or casualties, it was frequently in the face 
of video and images that contradicted the official Rus-
sian line. This created a credibility gap for the Russians.
POWS
The Chechens were better at getting their message 
out, often turning a tactical operation into a worldwide 
media event with strategic repercussions. The broad 
coverage given to Russian prisoner repatriation is but one 
example of this. Shamil Basaev and other Chechen com-
manders made headlines by turning over Russian POWs 
to their family members, usually their mothers. The 
image of Russian soldiers, who appeared to have been 
relatively well treated and who were obviously happy to 
be released, thanking their captors, while family mem-
bers, desperate to have their sons back, hugged and kissed 
Basaev and other Chechens, was a public relations coup. 
The media value was far more important than the 
release of the prisoners itself. In fact, the strategy of 
the media coverage of the prisoner repatriation not only 
gained sympathy for the Chechens because it demon-
strated honor and a sense of fair play, but it also helped 
galvanize the strongest anti-Chechen war movement in 
Russia—mothers against the war. The Committee of 
Soldiers' Mothers of Russia remains active and continues 
to track independently Russian casualties in Chechnya. 
In this way Basaev and other Chechen leaders played to 
multiple audiences at once: global, Russian and Chechen. 
While critics, and the Russian leadership, might 
rightly say that the media was pandering to the Chech-
ens, they failed to recognize what the media is, what
a story is, and more importantly how to work with or 
manipulate the media to their ends. War reporting can be 
broken down into five factors: Bias, Knowledge, Logis-
tics, Risk and Access. A successful media operation will 
incorporate a strategy to help the media towards all those 
ends. This does not necessarily entail telling the media 
what to print or play, yet it will provide an environment 
in which the media can operate and fulfill their mandate.
Budyonnovsk
Even in desperation, in the best Dunkirkian 
tradition, the Chechen side used the media to snatch 
victory from defeat.4 In June 1995, with the Russian 
Army bearing down on the remnants of the Chechen 
separatist movement, Basaev led a group of more than 
one hundred Chechens into Russia. Caught in the city 
of Budyonnovsk, Basaev and his men shot up the police 
station and a few additional targets, killing dozens before 
retreating to the central hospital to take hostages and care 
for his wounded.
His tiny band was outnumbered and surrounded 
by Russian units, including Special Forces, but Basaev 
quickly turned to media operations to salvage the day. 
Likely due to the number of hostages, and the disposition 
of the Russian government under Yeltsin, Basaev was 
granted media access and was able to hold a number of 
press conferences from within the hospital. More inter-
esting, Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin
4. Dunkirkian refers to the British withdrawal from Dunkirk in 1940; 
the British government was able to spin the forced retreat into a moral 
victory, emphasizing that the British Expeditionary Force had been
saved to fight another day.
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negotiated with Basaev live on Russian TV while Russian 
President Yeltsin was out of country at a G8 Summit.5
The result—Basaev and his men were granted 
safe passage back to Chechnya on busses with Rus-
sian hostages/volunteers as human shields.6 More 
important, Basaev was able to wrangle a cease-fire 
from Russia at the very moment the Chechen separat-
ist movement was at the point of breaking under the 
strain of Russian military might. The Chechens used 
the ceasefire to get themselves reorganized and even-
tually attack and seize Grozny two more times before 
the Russians capitulated and withdrew from Chechnya. 
Basaev's stature at home and abroad was even greater 
than before. He became a household name in Russia.
Media during the First War:
The Russian Perspective and Approach
By most accounts, the Russian attitude towards the 
media in general was antagonistic and not proactive in its 
approach to media operations. Obviously, the condition 
of the Russian Army in the mid-1990s challenged its 
operational capabilities to the limit and the ability to 
plan, let alone implement, an effective information 
operation campaign might not have been possible. But 
the inability to apply any significant media campaign 
hurt Russian efforts to counter the strong media message 
the Chechens were disseminating and convince the world 
and even its own population that the war in Chechnya 
was necessary, justified, important to national security, 
and worth the costs. Despite a steady flow of traditional 
news conferences and press releases claiming operational 
successes and pending victory, the Russian government 
and military could not convince or sell the international, 
or even the Russian media, on its efforts in Chechnya.
Like ABC, CBS, and other news agencies covering 
Chechnya during the first war, Mark Bauman's NBC 
team had to cross both the Russian and Chechen lines 
every day to reach the feed points in Ingushetia and on 
the Dagestan border. In one incident, while filming the 
Russian armored columns roll into the city, the NBC 
and CBS positions were so close to the tanks and BTRs 
(armoured personnel carrier) passing by that a CBS 
soundman slapped CBS bumper stickers on the back of 
the Russian armor as they thundered past. During filming 
a Russian special forces squad drove up on a BTR order-
ing them to move, throwing stun grenades and shooting at
5. Chechnya: Separatism or Jihad, Combat Films and Research,
2005; see also Russian NTV news coverage for the week of June
14-19, 1995.
6. Initial press reports stated that there was sympathy for the Chechens 
from the hostages themselves. This was very unpopular in Russia and 
has been all but forgotten and much of the facts lost to history as Rus-
sian media have become less and less independent. Reference original 
news reports by Russian NTV, week of June 14-19, 2005.
the legs of the NBC crew with rubber bullets. The event 
would have been lost, but one of the other news crews a 
few hundred feet away witnessed and filmed the desper-
ate situation in which the NBC crew found themselves.7
While the episode may be extreme and not represen-
tative of the entire Russian military's relationship with 
the media, it stands in stark contrast to the assistance 
given journalists by Chechen fighters inside Grozny. 
The NBC crew's bad experience is just part of a larger 
failure of Russian forces to engage in media operations.
Perhaps the greatest challenge that the Russian mili-
tary faced in Chechnya was that media operations to 
sway public opinion were a hard sell in the face of the 
near indiscriminate bombing of the capital and the killing 
of Chechen and Russian civilians alike. Opting for blunt 
force and massing of firepower in an urban area like Gro-
zny did not leave the Russians much room to construct a 
media message that might have appealed to any audience 
in the face of so much destruction. In fact, the media, 
many of whom were veterans of the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia, were able to make quick and accurate compar-
isons of the bombardments of Sarajevo and Grozny, high-
lighting the intensity and the brutality of Russian barrage.
Taking a page out of the U.S. Army's new counter-
insurgency manual, all operations should be built on a bed 
of information operations, and all operations should be in 
support of the overall media message. The Russian mili-
tary was either unwilling or unable to tie any media cam-
paign to the combat tactics applied; moreover, Russian 
military action was a difficult sell in the face of moments of 
extreme brutality, such as the 1995 massacre at Shamansk.
Media during the Current War:
The Chechen Perspective and Approach
Chechen media operations of the second Chechen 
war (1999-present) stand in stark contrast to the strate-
gies of the first Chechen war. The biggest shift in the 
media operations conducted by the Chechens between 
the first and second wars are directly linked to at least 
four factors: the perceived failure to attract global sym-
pathy and tangible support for the Chechen cause outside 
the Islamic world; splits within the Chechen resistance; 
the brutality of the war itself; and an evolution of tactics.
If one were to examine the primary websites of the 
Chechen resistance movement in 1995 and then again in 
the last five years, there is a remarkable difference between 
the general theme of the site and stories covered. Kavkaz- 
center.com was initially dedicated to the Chechen con-
flict. However, it has now become a portal for anti-Rus-
sian and anti-Western stories stretching from Chechnya to 
the U.S.-directed operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and
7. The videotape of the event in question was pooled out to all the 
news agencies and can still be found in various network archives.
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The home page of Kavkaz.net in 2007, highlighting the Chechen separatist leadership in the banner and featuring news stories that focus on 
Islalmic struggles worldwide, demonstrates the evolution of media awareness and scope from the early years of the Chechen-Russian conflict, 
when the site’s emphasis was centered squarely on the Chechen conflict.
anti-Israeli operations in Palestine. Kavkazcenter.com is 
now a media tool of the global jihad in which the con-
flict in Chechnya is one of many battlegrounds globally.
In the beginning the war was about separatism and 
independence, albeit the Chechens are Muslim. General 
Dudaev and Maskhadov were clearly seeking a secular 
path for Chechnya. However, with most of the original 
Chechen leadership dead, the influx of foreign Islamic 
volunteers, and the lack of official recognition by the West, 
the Chechen resistance movement metastasized to a path 
of jihad.8 Chechen moderates who fought for an indepen-
dent secular Muslim state have been killed, marginalized or 
coerced to consider and embrace the Wahhabism brought 
to Chechnya by jihadists like al Khattab.9 This evolu-
tion has changed the face of Chechen media operations.
This is strongly evident on recent home pages of 
Kavkazcenter.com, which boasts photos of the current 
Chechen insurgency leadership under the banner “Amirs 
of the Caucasus.” Who is the target of this media blast? It 
isn't the sympathetic Westerner that the Chechen move-
ment sought to influence during the first war, nor theWest- 
ern media, but the jihadist and would-be jihadist. Assum-
ing there is a media strategy, at some point the Chechen 
leadership decided that they would gain more by posting
images and names of their leadership in the context of 
jihad, rather than keeping the leadership's identity in the 
shadows, or presenting them as Chechen nationalists. 
What is left of the Chechen insurgency has determined 
that appealing to its Umma is more important than hid-
ing from the Russians and reaching out to the West.
Splits in leadership also split the grand strategy and 
message of the insurgency. The concept of a central-
ized like-minded Chechen command has always been a 
bit misleading as field commanders were often at odds 
with one another and as the movement transmogrified, 
roughly speaking, into separatist and Islamic ideolo-
gies. There were always questions about Basaev's loy-
alty to Maskhadov; now, with new leadership, there 
are more questions. Other figures in the separatist 
movement who demonstrated a pro-West stance have 
been branded traitors by the more Islamist factions.10
The reputation of the Chechen insurgency, once 
seen by the press as a brave freedom fighter, chival-
rous towards prisoners, was very much tarnished via 
their actions during the chaotic interwar years, when 
internal fighting, killings and kidnappings became so 
common that all NGOs and outside media opted not to 
operate in Chechnya. The hard-fought media message
8. Chechnya: Separatism or Jihad.
9. Interviews with Ilias Akhmadov, Grozny, December 20, 1997,
Washington, D.C., February 6, 2005, and December 18-19, 2007.
10. Periodic discussions with Ilyas Akhmadov, December 2005 
to December 2007, as well as frequent postings on pro-Chechen 
websites run by Movladi Udugov.
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rang hollow in the face of Basaev and Khattab's incur-
sion into Dagestan in 1999. The war in Chechnya for 
the media-dependent observer had become something 
else, something the Putin administration was quick to 
capitalize on—a jihad for the entire north Caucasus.
In addition, the Chechen insurgency has conducted 
increasingly violent acts against Russian civilian targets, 
most notably the tragedies of the Moscow theater and 
Beslan. Media stories such as the abuse of Iraqi prison-
ers at Abu Ghraib have done irreparable damage to the 
U.S. effort to compete, let alone win, the information war 
in Iraq. Likewise, the Chechen attacks at the Moscow 
Nord-Ost theater in 2002 and Elementary School No. 
1 in Beslan in 2004 nullified the possibility of popular 
support for the Chechen insurgency amongst Muslims 
globally, in Russia, or even amongst many Chechens.
It is tempting to say that like Russia's inability to 
sell its message during the first war, the Chechens now 
were unable to sell their message during the second war. 
But it was more than that. In addition to not having a 
convincing media campaign to counteract the instabil-
ity of interwar independence and the increasing bru-
tality of Chechen attacks, the conflict with Russia had 
changed, and the audiences had changed as well. At 
some point during the first war, the Chechen leadership 
realized that international and, specifically, Western sup-
port for their cause would not be forthcoming. Instead, 
the only source of support came from the Islamic world, 
including support from various jihadist organizations 
and individuals. This realization reshaped the media 
message from within the Chechen movement—framing 
the fight as a jihad rather than a struggle for indepen-
dence. Moreover, global conditions and attitudes now 
favor Russia. The attack on the World Trade Center tow-
ers on September 11th, Russian President Putin's insis-
tence that the Chechen conflict be seen as part of this 
larger global war on Islamic radicalism, and the Bush 
administration's acceptance of the Russian position on 
Chechnya, helped change the Chechen war forever.
Media during the Current War:
The Russian Perspective and Approach
The Putin administration's approach to media opera-
tions, with few exceptions, has been to severely limit 
press access via Russian channels, while taking con-
trol of independent media in Russia. Media critical of 
Putin's administration and Russian prosecution of the 
war in Chechnya have been systematically muzzled, 
while a number of key journalists have been killed or 
have sought asylum outside Russia.11 Western media 
organizations in Russia have felt the pressure as well,
11. “Russia's New Refugees,” Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2007.
as demonstrated by the government's ban on ABC fol-
lowing Andrey Babistsky's interview of Basaev during 
the summer of 2005.12 The result has been to limit the 
world's view of Chechnya and give the Russian Army a 
freer hand to prosecute the war.
For Chechnya specifically, Russia has instituted 
a strategy of isolation, closing Chechnya off to the 
outside world, and depriving the Chechen resistance 
of much needed coverage for their cause.13 There 
are still press junkets into Grozny and media cover-
age of important events like the swearing in of the 
new pro-Moscow Chechen president, but the most 
significant information operation has been to iso-
late the Chechen insurgency from any press coverage.
Russia has also been very successful in discredit-
ing the Chechens globally by perpetuating the myth 
of Chechen jihadists fighting against the U.S. and 
Coalition partners in both Afghanistan and Iraq.14 
Chechen bravado, success in arms and their appear-
ances in other conflicts on the former Soviet periph-
ery in the mid-1990s perpetuated an already firmly 
established reputation as a warrior people, helping cre- 
ate—with Russian assistance—a new myth of a global 
Chechen force engaged in multiple global battlefields.
In the immediate aftermath of September 11 ethnic 
Uzbek and Tajik Northern Alliance personnel were quick 
to walk the battlefield at Qala i-Jangi and pronounce 
dozens killed as Chechens.15 They also fed Western news 
crews other unlikely stories that were quickly transmit-
ted to hungry audiences worldwide, such as fifty-some 
Chechen fighters who threw themselves into the river below 
rather than surrender to the Northern Alliance and U.S. 
Special Forces during the fall of Kunduz in late Novem-
ber 2001.16 As recently as summer 2007, Chechens were 
given credit for conducting military operations against 
Pakistani Army units in Pakistan's western provinces. 
As a result of these media reports, U.S. Army intel-
ligence briefings continue to warn U.S. troops and 
airmen about Chechens operating in both Afghani-
stan and Iraq, yet not a single Chechen has been 
identified—killed or interned in either conflict.17 *
12. “Russia Bars ABC, Citing Interview with Chechen Rebel,” New
York Times International, August 3, 2005, p. A3.
13. Timothy L. Thomas, “Russian Tactical Lessons Learned Fighting 
Chechen Separatists,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 18 (2005): 
731-66.
14 “Shattering the al Qaeda-Chechen Myth: Part I,” Chechnya Weekly 
(The Jamestown Foundation), vol. 4, no. 35, October 2, 2003; and 
Part II, vol. 4, no. 40, November 6, 2003.
15. As witnessed by author in the immediate aftermath of the fortress 
uprising at Qala Jangi.
16. “Northern Alliance Reports Taliban Surrounded in Konduz,”
CNN.com/Transcripts, aired November 18, 2001.
17. Author's discussions with numerous U.S. Army personnel in both
Afghanistan and Iraq (2002-2007).
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Chechen hostage takers led by Mosvar Barayev get their message out via the press during the siege of 
Moscow's Nord-Ost Theater in October 2002.
Conclusions
During the first Chechen war, Chechen fighters were 
the darlings of the Western, and at times, even the Russian 
press. They made significant advances in attracting non-
Chechen Muslims to their cause as well. While never 
in large numbers, foreign fighters did trickle in from the 
U.S., Britain, Turkey, Jordan and other Arab states. The 
Chechens also captured the moral high ground as the 
underdog, in part because the Russian Army was strug-
gling and morally bankrupt in the immediate aftermath 
of the USSR. Media stories of Russian soldiers selling 
weapons to Chechen fighters, and even their fellow sol-
diers, to Chechen kidnappers, cast a shadow on Russian 
operations well into the second war.18
But conditions of war, for example, attrition and 
increased brutality, global events (September 11), and 
change in target audience, dramatically effect media 
strategies. Russian and Western audiences were impor-
tant during the first war. However, during the second war, 
the primary target of Chechen media operations shifted 
towards the only demographic where any assistance was 
forthcoming—the Muslim world. Chechen operations 
also became more brutal and reached outside the conflict 
zone into Russia, killing children in the case of Beslan, 
and giving Russia the moral high ground.
Recent media coverage from Chechnya is the clear-
est indication of who is winning the battle for Chechnya 
today. A 2007 New York Times article examined a revi-
18. Elizabeth Rubin, “Only You Can Save Your Sons,” New York 
Times Magazine, July 8, 2001.
talized Grozny, complete with new tree-lined sidewalks, 
cars, people, and a mosque—a thriving metropolis out 
of the ruins of more than thirteen years of chaos and 
war19—the clearest indication yet that Russia and Chech-
nya's Moscow-backed government has won the war for 
the tiny republic.
But media management of the Chechen wars raises a 
point about successful media operations. There is no one 
decisive manner to orchestrate media operations. Chech-
nya won the first war with much credit to its ability to 
engage the media, while Russia is winning the current 
conflict by quashing media access and controlling the 
message. It is equally important to understand the target 
audience, global conditions, the strategic picture and tac-
tical nature of the conflict. Finally, as far as the five fac-
tors or war reporting are concerned—Bias, Knowledge, 
Logistics, Risk and Access—bias will always exist. The 
Chechens better managed knowledge, logistics, risk 
and access during the first war. Since then, in contrast, 
Russia has better managed the logistics, risk and access 
reporters depend on in war.
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19. C. J. Chivers, “Under Iron Hand of Russia's Proxy, a Chechen 
Revival,” New York Times, September 30, 2007.
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